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Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2877
(Mem)
Tristan T. Riddell
I. ABSTRACT
In Drakes Bay the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit ruled that language
within appropriations legislation aimed specifically at the expiration of the Drakes Bay Oyster
Company’s Reservation of Use and Occupancy within Point Reyes National Seashore provided
the Secretary of the Interior discretion whether to issue a new special use permit for oyster
farming. The inclusion of the term “notwithstanding” ensured that the Secretary was not
obligated to consider previously passed legislation, department policy, or any other requirements
in reviewing whether to reauthorize the special use permit. The Ninth Circuit held that they had
jurisdiction to review the narrow issue of whether the Secretary misinterpreted granted authority.
II. INTRODUCTION
In Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
(“Ninth Circuit”) held that the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”) acted within defined
parameters of § 124 of a Department of the Interior Appropriations Act (“DOI Act”) by allowing
a special use permit for oyster farming within California’s Point Reyes National Seashore to
expire.1 Drakes Bay sought injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”)
based on several legal theories, which included violations of: § 124 of the DOI Act, the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and other federal regulations.2 The Ninth Circuit held that
the Secretary did not violate any statutory mandate because the “notwithstanding” clause within
§ 124 provided the Secretary discretion to decide whether or not to extend the existing special
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use permit.3 Although a NEPA review of the permit denial was completed, the Ninth Circuit
deemed it unnecessary, and any error tied to the review was found harmless.4
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1976, portions of the Point Reyes National Seashore, including an area known as
Drakes Estero, were designated “wilderness” under the Wilderness Act.5 Due to the existence of
commercial oyster farming operations within Drakes Estero, these areas were designated as
“potential wilderness.”6 Congress slated lands designated “potential wilderness” for conversion
to “wilderness” upon termination of incompatible use.7
In 1972 the Johnson Oyster Co. conveyed lands designated as “potential wilderness” to
the United States.8 As part of the sale, a forty-year reservation of use and occupancy for oyster
farming was retained.9 The reservation of use and occupancy stated that upon ‘“expiration of the
reserved term, a special use permit may be issued for the continued occupancy of the
property.’”10 The property reservation and use transferred to Drakes Bay upon its purchase of
the Drakes Estero oyster farm from Johnson Oyster Co.11
In 2009, Congress passed a special provision, known as §124 related to oyster farming in
Drakes Estero as part of the of the 2009 DOI Act.12 Section 124 provided that “notwithstanding
any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to issue a special use permit
with the same terms and conditions as the existing authorization . . . for a period of 10 years from
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November 30, 2012.”13
Recognizing that “Section 124 ‘grant[ed] [him] the authority to issue a new SUP,’” the
Secretary directed the National Park Service to allow the Drakes Bay special use permit to
expire.14 The decision was based on the terms of the reservation and use of occupancy, National
Park Service policy, and specific legislation aimed at Point Reyes National Seashore wilderness
designation.15
Drakes Bay sought an injunction and declaratory judgment based on violation of the
APA. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied the preliminary
injunction and held it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the declaratory judgment because the
Secretary’s decision was fully discretionary within the statutory context.16
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction and Scope of the “Notwithstanding” Clause
Federal courts have “‘jurisdiction to review agency action for abuse of discretion when
the alleged abuse of discretion involves violation . . . of constitutional, statutory, regulatory, or
other legal mandates or restrictions.’”17 Here, due to § 124’s “notwithstanding” clause, the Ninth
Circuit found, reversing the district court, that it had jurisdiction to review whether there was a
misunderstanding of authority or a misinterpretation of how other statutory provisions impacted
the Secretary’s decision-making process.18
The Ninth Circuit found that §124 provided the Secretary with the authorization to act on
the special use permit.19 This authorization provided the Secretary discretion to either issue or
13
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deny a permit.20 The “notwithstanding” clause clarifies that conflicting laws do not block the
Secretary’s discretion.21 The Point Reyes Wilderness Act was one of those laws.22 The dissent
contended that legislative history tied to the Point Reyes Wilderness Act supports continuation of
oyster farming as a compatible use within Drakes Estero and lands designated “wilderness.”23
The Ninth Circuit held that the clear inclusion of the “notwithstanding” clause was to ensure
previous legislation, like the Point Reyes Wilderness Act, would not prevent the Secretary from
exercising discretionary authority under § 124.24
The inclusion of the “notwithstanding” clause in § 124 provided the Secretary discretion
in deciding whether or not to renew Drakes Bay’s special use permit.25 Had Congress intended
to require the Secretary to grant the permit, the Ninth Circuit determined, Congress would have
excluded the “notwithstanding” provision from § 124 and specifically required such an action.26
B. Preliminary Injunction Not Warranted
To receive injunctive relief, Drakes Bay had to establish a likelihood that it would
succeed on the merits, it would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, the balance of
equities was in its favor, and that it was in the public’s interest to grant such relief.27
Drakes Bay alleged that the Secretary misinterpreted his authority under § 124.28 The
Ninth Circuit, in denying injunctive relief, found that the Secretary’s decision to allow the permit
to expire was clearly within his authority.29 The Secretary, in rendering his decision, stated, §
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124 “does not prescribe the factors on which I must base my decision.”30 In reaching the
decision, the Secretary considered existing department policy and congressional intent that had
been expressed in the House committee report of the appropriations bill.31 The Secretary
correctly recognized that he had the authority to either extend or allow expiration of the existing
permit.32
In addition to failing on the merits, Drakes Bay could not show that a balance of equities
weighed in its favor.33 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling, stating “[t]he public
benefits both from the enjoyment of protected wilderness and of local oysters.”34 The Ninth
Circuit also noted that Drakes Bay had been repeatedly warned of the Secretary’s impending
decision and was fully aware the reservation of use and occupancy was set to expire in 2012.35
V. CONCLUSION
Congress’ use of the “notwithstanding” clause in § 124 left the decision to extend the
special use permit to the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior. The sole stipulation tied to
the decision was that it had to consider existing federal policy, as it pertained to the Wilderness
Act, the Point Reyes Wilderness Act, and National Park Service management policies. These
existing regulatory and policy structures, coupled with the discretionary provision of § 124,
confirmed the designation of Drakes Estero as “wilderness” and the end of oyster farming
within the Point Reyes National Seashore.
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